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  
Abstract-- The increased interconnectivity and complexity of 
Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) systems in 
power system networks has exposed the systems to a multitude of 
potential vulnerabilities. In this paper we present a novel 
approach for a next generation SCADA-specific Intrusion 
Detection System (IDS). The proposed system analyses multiple 
attributes in order to provide a comprehensive solution able to 
mitigate varied cyberattacks threats. The multi-attribute IDS 
comprises a heterogeneous whitelist and behavior-based concept 
in order to make SCADA cyber systems more secure. This paper 
also proposes a multilayer cyber-security framework based on 
IDS for protecting SCADA cyber-security in Smart Grids 
without compromising the availability of normal data. In 
addition, this paper presents a SCADA-specific cyber-security 
test-bed to investigate simulated attacks and which has been used 
in the paper to validate the proposed approach. 
 
Index Terms-- Smart Grid, SCADA, Cyber-security, Intrusion 
Detection 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) 
systems have long played a significant role in power system 
operation, becoming increasingly complex and interconnected 
as state-of-the-art information and communication 
technologies (ICT) are adopted. The increased complexity and 
interconnection of SCADA systems have exposed them to a 
wide range of cybersecurity vulnerabilities. Furthermore, 
SCADA systems with legacy devices lack inbuilt cyber-
security consideration, which has resulted in serious cyber-
security vulnerable points. In practice, unauthorized or 
malicious access from outside sources, using Internet protocol 
(IP)-driven proprietary or local-area networks can threaten 
SCADA systems by exploiting communication weaknesses to 
launch simple or elaborate attacks which may lead to denial of 
service, deliberate maloperation or catastrophic failure, and, 
consequently, com- promise the safety and stability of power 
system operations. Thus, the requirement to strengthen 
cybersecurity in SCADA as part of smarter grids, in particular, 
is a pertinent priority to ensure reliable operation and govern 
system stability in terms of communications integrity.  
In recent years, malicious cyber-security incidents have 
occurred in SCADA systems. For instance, in July 2010, the 
Stuxnet worm attacked the Siemens SIMATIC WinCC 
SCADA system and physical Programmable Logic Controllers 
                                                          
 
 
(PLCs), exploiting a number of vulnerabilities including at 
least four in the Microsoft Windows operating system. It is the 
most famous malware attack to have damaged an industrial 
infrastructure directly. According to Symantec's statistics, 
approximately 45,000 systems around the world have been 
infected by the worm including Iranian nuclear facilities [1]. 
Many utilities remain concerned at the possibility of 
“collateral damage” to their infrastructures from Stuxnet-like 
attacks in the future. 
In the early history of SCADA systems it was widely 
believed that such systems were secure in cyber space since 
they were air-gapped - that is, physically isolated from public 
networks. In other words, only physical security was a concern 
rather than cybersecurity. Stuxnet crossed both the cyber and 
physical world by manipulating the control system of the 
critical infrastructure, demonstrating that “security by 
obscurity” is no longer a valid approach.  
With the application of IT technologies, new 
cybervulnerabilities will emerge in smart grids and similar 
critical infrastructures. These vulnerabilities could be 
exploited, not only from outside sources, such as terrorists, 
hackers, competitors, or industrial espionage, but also from 
inside threats, such as ex-employees, disgruntled employees, 
third-party vendors, or site engineers. As well as deliberate 
attacks, cybervulnerabilities in SCADA systems may also be 
affected by inadvertent events (e.g., user errors, negligence 
equipment failures, and natural disasters). Security for 
protecting the entire smart-grid techno- logical environment 
requires the consideration of many subsystems that make up 
the smart grid, for example, wide-area monitoring protection 
and control (WAMPAC), distribution-management system 
(DMS), advanced metering infrastructure (AMI), and higher 
level communication architectures at the grid system level. 
The scope of this paper is to focus on one important sub- 
system level of the smart-grid environment, specifically cyber- 
security for digital substations. This paper proposes a multi- 
layer SCADA cybersecurity attack detection system that 
improves intrusion detection system (IDS) technology. A 
realistic SCADA-specific cybersecurity testbed was also 
developed to investigate cyberattacks and test the proposed 
IDS methods. This environment provides a platform for the in-
depth analysis of real attack scenarios in a replicated 
substation local-area net- work (LAN) in order to facilitate the 
development of effective attack countermeasure tools and 
technologies for the SCADA cyberdomain. 
Section II presents the related work. Section III proposes a 
conceptual multilayer cyber-security framework for SCADA 
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 systems. Section IV proposes a SCADA-specific IDS 
combining whitelist and behavior-based methods. Section V 
discusses the implementation approach of the SCADA-IDS. In 
Section VI, a SCADA-specific cybersecurity testbed that 
investigates cyberattacks is presented to exemplify and 
validate the proposed SCADA-IDS. Sections VII and VIII are 
the discussion and conclusion, respectively. 
II.  RELATED WORK 
SCADA systems in the Smart Grid will inevitably contain 
legacy systems that cannot be updated, patched, or protected 
by conventional IT security techniques. With limited 
computing resources in legacy devices and the lack of inbuilt 
security for SCADA systems, it is difficult to embed 
traditional cyber security techniques into these legacy systems. 
In these situations, new intrusion detection systems are needed 
to monitor the operation of such systems and to detect threats 
against the systems resulting from misuse by legitimate users 
or intentional attacks by external hackers.  
Intrusion detection technologies in the IT domain are 
relatively mature and numerous intrusion detection methods 
have been presented [2]. Zhang et al. [3] presented a 
distributed IDS for wireless mesh networks in Smart Grids. 
However, it is not specific for SCADA environments. Many 
researchers have applied and developed intrusion and anomaly 
detection approaches targeted for SCADA systems, such as 
statistics based intrusion detection methods and SCADA-
specific intrusion detection approaches [4-12]. However, 
research on this cross-disciplinary subject is still at an early 
stage. 
IDSs have been introduced to SCADA systems using 
statistical approaches to classify network traffic as normal or 
abnormal. To build the statistical models, various modeling 
methods can be used, such as neural networks, regression 
models, and Bayesian networks [9]. However, most statistical 
intrusion methods generate false positives which result in false 
alerts, and false negatives which miss real attacks.  
SCADA-specific IDSs have been developed for SCADA 
systems using critical state, model and rule based methods. 
The primary limitation of current SCADA-specific IDSs is a 
lack of full understanding of SCADA applications and 
protocols, as highlighted by Idaho National Laboratory [4]. 
Carcano et al. [6] propose critical state-based IDS for SCADA 
based on the Modbus protocol in a power plant. However, this 
system can only detect a limited class of attacks against PLC 
systems. Model-based detection is not new in traditional IDS 
work (e.g., specification-based intrusion detection can be seen 
as model based). Cheung et al. [7] believe that model-based   
monitoring   to  detect  unknown  attacks  is more feasible in 
SCADA systems than in general IT networks: three model-
based techniques to monitor Modbus transmission control 
protocol (TCP) networks, using protocol-level modes, 
communication-pattern-based detection, and a learning-based 
approach. Unfortunately, no quantitative  results were 
obtained from this paper nor detailed analysis regarding 
experimental validation. A rule-based IDS for an intelligent 
electronic device (IED) based on IEC 61850 is realized by 
Snort in [8]. The Snort rules are obtained from experimental 
data based upon simulated cyberattacks, such as a denial-of-
service (DoS) attack, password cracking, and address 
resolution protocol (ARP) spoofing. The proposed blacklist 
approach is shown to detect known attacks effectively. 
However, blacklists are typically not effective against 
unknown threats or undiscovered vulnerabilities, also called 
zero-day attacks.  
III.  MULTILAYER SCADA CYBER-SECURITY FRAMEWORK  
Current security countermeasures in SCADA systems 
mainly focus on protecting systems from external intrusions or 
malicious attacks. For example, incoming traffic to substations, 
control centers, and corporate networks will be inspected by 
commercial firewalls or IDSs. However, this security 
approach only considers perimeter defenses and ignores 
interior detection within a substation network or a control 
center.  For in- stance, an engineer can enter a substation and 
connect his or her laptop to the LAN. An intentional or 
unintended attack via an infected laptop now has an improved 
chance of success be- cause perimeter defenses have been 
bypassed. In practice and in worst-case scenarios, all of the 
cyber assets in SCADA systems should be regarded as 
vulnerable. However, we cannot demand that all cyberassets 
meet the highest security requirements due to financial cost, 
time and system constraints. Therefore, in order to address this 
problem, a SCADA cybersecurity framework based on 
SCADA-IDS is proposed, as illustrated in Fig. 1 that includes 
the following three aspects: 
 
 
Fig. 1.  Multilayer SCADA cyber-security framework with IDS 
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 A.  Security Enclaves 
A security enclave [13] is a secure group of cybersystems 
connected by one or more internal or external networks using 
suitable security policies and techniques in order to minimize 
the attack surface and its impact. It may be defined by logic 
functions or by physical distance. Compared with the 
traditional SCADA structure, the proposed secure architecture 
divides the normal corporate network into a new corporate 
network, including enterprise servers (e.g., proxy, web, and e-
mail server) and corporate demilitarized zones (DMZs) 
involving desktops, laptops, engineering workstations (EWS), 
business servers, etc. In addition, the proposed secure 
architecture defines two en- claves in the control center, that is, 
the control center DMZ containing the intercontrol center 
communication protocol (ICCP) sever, virtual private network 
(VPN) server, database, etc., and the control center enclave, 
including the front-end processor (FEP), human–machine 
interface (HMI), SCADA/energy-management system (EMS), 
etc., and two enclaves in the substation, as shown in Fig. 1. 
Here, DMZ means that a network segment is a “security buffer 
area” between the internal network and the external network. 
In the substation, the data concentrator (DC) or protocol 
gateway (PG) is used to collect and translate data from 
different IEDs or remote terminal units (RTUs) with 
individual protocols. 
B.  Perimeter Defense and Interior Detection 
The proposed enclave-based SCADA cybersecurity 
framework focuses on perimeter defenses against attacks from 
outside the enclaves and internal detection for malicious 
behaviors or misuse of employees from inside enclaves using 
the proposed multilayer SCADA-IDS scheme. In order to 
deploy appropriate perimeter defenses in suitable locations, it 
is necessary to identify the boundaries of security enclaves. In 
Fig. 1, the SCADA-IDSs are deployed in the enclave 
boundaries for the perimeter defense, as well as inside the 
enclave for interior detection. A SCADA IDS can analyze 
traffic not only across enclave perimeters, but also within a 
security enclave, for example, between an HMI and a PG in a 
substation. 
C.  SCADA-IDS Management System 
The proposed SCADA-IDS management system contains 
security information and event management (SIEM) tools in 
the security operations center (SOC), IDS security managers at 
enterprise level and SCADA level, and distributed IDSs, as 
shown in Fig. 2. The SOC may include the correlation and 
intelligence capabilities to manage large-scale cyber incidents 
[21]. An SIEM (e.g., QRadar SIEM [20]) platform supports 
log management, real-time monitoring, and security event 
management from a broad range of systems. It establishes an 
early warning system to detect threats based on log events and 
flow information from the enterprise level and the SCADA 
level. The IDS security manager is designed to administer, 
monitor, and con- figure an individual IDS by secure TCP/IP 
connections. It is possible that the intrusion detection 
exchange protocol (IDXP) is adopted to exchange information 
among different IDSs. Under real circumstances, a SCADA-
IDS can be set to a local mode which provides local security 
detection and log management; in addition, it transmits some 
data to a security manager for more comprehensive situational 
awareness across multiple security enclaves. Both commercial 
IDSs and the customized IDS can be adopted in the proposed 
SCADA cybersecurity framework. 
In this paper, a multiattribute intrusion detection approach is 
proposed which is tailored for cybersecurity at the SCADA 
level, as described in the next section. The IDS system at the 
enterprise level can be realized by commercial solutions, 
which is beyond the scope of this paper. 
IV.  PROPOSED MULTI-ATTRIBUTE IDS FOR SCADA 
In comparison with traditional IT networks, SCADA 
systems have distinguishing features, such as the use of a 
limited number of packets (low throughput), a fixed number of 
communication devices, a limited number of communication 
protocols, and regular communication and behavior patterns. 
Therefore, a SCADA-specific IDS is proposed as an effective 
tool to identify external malicious attacks and internal 
unintended misuse. The proposed hybrid intrusion detection 
method consists of three attributes: 1) access-control whitelists; 
2) protocol-based whitelists; and 3) behavior-based rules. The 
basic detection procedure is illustrated in Fig. 3. 
 
Fig. 2.  IDS security management system 
 
 
 
Fig. 3.  Progress for Hybrid SCADA-IDS 
A.  Access Control Whitelists (ACW) 
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 Control (MAC) addresses (MACsrc and MACdstMACୢୱ୲) in the 
Ethernet layer, source and destination Internet Protocol (IP) 
addresses (IP src IPୱ୰ୡand IPdstIPୢ ୱ୲) in the network layer, and 
source and destination ports (Portsrc Portୱ୰ୡand PortdstPortୢୱ୲) 
in the transport layer. If any of the addresses or ports is not in 
the corresponding whitelist, the detector will take some 
actions, e.g., alert in IDS mode and log the detection results. 
That is, 
   ( , )wlAC AC Actions alert log   (1) 
where AC =  MACsrc, MACdst, IP src, IPୱ୰ୡ IPdst, Portsrc, Portୱ୰ୡPortdst  and ACwl represents corresponding whitelist set.  
In addition, each host or device in a SCADA system has a  
unique < IP, MAC>  match. If the device has not been replaced 
with new hardware and the same IP address of the device is 
detected from two or more MAC addresses, it means that a 
spoofing attack may be taking place. 
B.  Protocol-Based Whitelists (PBW) 
The aforementioned access control whitelist refers to layer 
2-4 in terms of the open systems interconnection (OSI) model. 
The protocol-based whitelist method is related to the 
application layer (up to layer 7) and deals with various 
SCADA protocols such as Modbus, DNP3, IEC 60870-5 
series, ICCP, IEC 61850, and proprietary protocols. In 
different scenarios, the detector can be set to support specific 
protocols. For example, when the IDS is deployed at the 
network between two control centers, the protocol-based 
detector only allows communication traffic complying with 
specific protocols, otherwise it will generate an alert message.  
C.  Behavior-Based Rules (BBR) 
As a necessary complement to the aforementioned whitelist 
methods, a behavior-based detection approach finds and 
defines normal and correct behaviors by deep packet 
inspection (DPI). This may include the analysis of a single 
packet or multiple packets together. SCADA-IDS in different 
scenarios may have different rules in terms of normal 
behaviors. If the IDS is located between an HMI and a 
protocol gateway within a substation, several behavior-based 
detectors are proposed and defined as follows. 
1) Correlation Detector: For a specific switching device, 
the switching state correlates with relevant measured values. 
For instance, if the switching state changes between open and 
closed, relevant measure values will correctly vary, otherwise, 
alarms will occur, i.e., 
 
       o cIf SV open MV AlertLogIf SV closed M I e eV I       (2) 
where SV represents a switching value; MV(I) means 
measured current values; and eo or ec is the positive threshold 
of the electric current value which is near zero. 
2) Relay Protection Function Detector: IED relay 
equipment generally has multiple protection functions (such as 
overload, overcurrent, and instantaneous overcurrent) for the 
purposes of detecting faults and minimizing impacts of faults 
by tripping the associated circuit breakers (CBs) in power 
systems. When an IED detects a fault and takes some actions 
according to associated protection algorithms, the alarm or trip 
information will be sent to the HMI in a substation or a control 
center by remote signaling data. The detector utilizes 
correlated information from remote measurement data to 
detect whether the protection information is correct. For 
example, in terms of the overload protection, provided one of 
three-phrase currents exceeds a certain value for a specified 
period of time, the overload protection action will occur. 
Meanwhile, the alarm or trip information will be uploaded as 
follows.    Overload alarm: When an over-load alarm signal occurs, 
at least one of the associated current measure values should 
exceed the predefined overload protection setting value. In 
contrast, when the overload alarm signal disappears, three-
phrase current measured values are all below the setting value. 
If any of the two rules is violated, the detector will generate 
actions. i.e., 
 
      10 , , | |ola a b c olola a b c olIf MV AlertLogIf MRS I I I IR I IVS I I       (3) 
where RSola  = 1, 0 means the over-load alarm signal occurs 
and disappears, respectively; MV (Ia, Ib, Ic) and MV (Ia | Ib | Ic) 
represent all the three-phrase current measured values and one 
of the three-phrase current measured values, respectively; and 
Iol is the overload protection setting value.   Overload trip: When an overload trip signal happens, all 
three-phrase current measured values should be near zero. In 
contrast, when the overload trip signal disappears, all three-
phrase current measured values will be below the setting value. 
If any of the two rules is violated, the detector will act. i.e., 
 
      | | | |10ol a b c 0ol a b c olIf MV AlertLogIf MRS I I I eR I IVS I I       (4) 
where RSol  = 1, 0 means that the overload trip signal happens 
and disappears, respectively; MV (Ia | Ib | Ic) means one of the 
three-phrase current measured values; eo represents a positive 
current value which is close zero; and Iol is overload protection 
setting value. 
3) Time-Related Detector: If the control commands are not 
correctly executed due to cyberattacks or misuse, a power 
network may become insecure or potentially unstable. Critical 
control commands have time-related constraints, such as the 
time interval limit and frequency limit. If the same command 
is sent too frequently, it may violate the following rules. In 
each case, the detector will initiate some actions (alert and log)  
      1 ,CV n CV n T Actions alert log     (5) 
where CV is a control command; n is a positive integer (n>1), 
and T
 
is the limit of time interval. 
 
     1 ,
1
CV n CV
F Actions alert log
n
    (6) 
where F
 
represents the frequency limit. 
4) Length Detector: When a SCADA packet contains bytes 
which indicate the length information about the packet in the 
payload, it is proposed that a length detector should be applied 
to detect that whether the number shown in the length bytes is 
equal to the real length of the payload, such that, 
   
  l rlPL PL Actions alert,log  (7) 
here PLl is the length value indicated in the length field of the 
payload, and PLrl stands for the practical length of the payload. 
5) Range Detector:  Normally, measured values belong to 
the operational range with upper and lower boundary values. 
These measured values may include current (I), voltage (U), 
active power (P), reactive power (Q), and frequency (f). If the 
measured value is outside the expected range, some actions 
will execute automatically, i.e.,
             ,, , , , , ,...min maxMV i MV i e i MV i e iActions alert log i I U P Q f       (8) 
where MV(i) (i = I, U, P , Q,  f,…) represents different measured 
values such as current, voltage, active power, reactive power, 
and frequency, [MV (i)min  e (i), MV (i)max+ e (i)] stand for the 
range between the upper and lower boundary and e(i) 
measures the tolerance.  
6) Function Code Detector: In terms of industrial network 
protocols, one of the common features is the use of function 
codes (used in DNP3) or type identification (used in IEC 
60870-5 series). The function code (or type identification) 
detector only allows specifically defined function codes (or 
type identification) according to different SCADA protocols, 
or else security actions will occur. Using the function code 
detector as an example    
 
1,2,...,|fc iPL FC i n Actions alert,log    (9) 
here PLfc is a function code in the payload and FCi represents 
the allowed function codes based on protocols. 
V.  SCADA-IDS IMPLEMENTATION  
In order to implement the SCADA-specific IDS proposed 
in this paper, the SCADA-IDS based on the Internet traffic 
and content analysis (ITACA) tool is developed. ITACA [14] 
is a software platform for traffic sniffing and real-time IP 
network analysis which has been developed by the Centre for 
Secure Information Technologies (CSIT) at the Queen’s 
University of Belfast. The extendable analysis tool enables the 
implementation of plugins to perform specific tasks, e.g., IDS. 
In this paper, the SCADA-specific IDS is developed in C/C++ 
using the ITACA platform, as illustrated in Fig. 4. 
The real-time SCADA-IDS combines ACW, PBW and 
BBR, as presented in Section IV, based on DPI, including 
single-packet and multiple-packet inspection. In the 
initialization stage, the parameters of SCADA-IDS are preset. 
The detailed implementation steps are as follows. 
1) The raw bytes of packet data are captured from the 
SCADA network by network-layer interface, which is realized 
by the packet capture (PCAP) library. The ITACA core can 
extract, interpret and analyze the SCADA flows and packets 
up to 4 Gb/sec in order to provide all possible information for 
the realization of SCADA-IDS plugins. It includes the 
following main modules: the protocol extractor, packet 
storage, flow look up table, event generator, plug-in queues 
and event controller. The detailed modules of the ITACA core 
architecture are described in [14]. 
 
 
Fig. 4.  The process for the implement of proposed SCADA-IDS 
 
2) To realize the ACW introduced in Section IV-A, the 
trusted source and destination MAC addresses, IP addresses 
and ports in the SCADA network are preset in the 
initialization stage.  
3) To implement the PBW discussed in Section IV-B, the 
Perl compatible regular expressions (PCRE) library is utilized 
to identify the SCADA protocol based on application-layer 
data using regular expression pattern matching. The SCADA 
protocol type is determined in the initialization stage 
according to specific application scenario. The proposed 
SCADA-IDS is capable of supporting widely used SCADA 
protocols such as Modbus, DNP3, IEC 60870-5-103/104, 
ICCP, IEC 61850, and some proprietary protocols.  
4) A database is set up for the SCADA-IDS which stores 
critical status parameters of the SCADA system in order to 
realize multiple packets (cross-packet) inspection, for example, 
to determine the status of circuit breakers (CBs) and protective 
relays. If the packet data have passed the detection of ACW 
and PBW, the database will be updated when the relevant 
status changes. 
5) The following detectors belong to BBR presented in 
Section IV-C. Among them, time-related detector, correlation 
detector and relay function detector span multiple packets 
which need the support of the database. The other detectors 
are single-packet inspection such as length detector, function 
code detector, and range detector.  
6) In the correlation detector described in Section IV-C, the 
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 threshold values eo or ec are preset. In terms of the relay 
function detector, the overload protection setting value Iol
 
is 
set according to the specification of IED and practical 
application. In the time-related detector mentioned in Section 
IV-C, the parameters T and F  are set in the initialization stage. 
The range parameters of the range detector are set in the 
initialization stage. The function codes of the function code 
detector are also set according to a proprietary SCADA 
protocol.  
If a packet violates any rule implemented from before (e.g., 
ACW, PBW, or BBR), the SCADA-IDS will take the 
appropriate action (e.g., alert), record the detection results in 
the log file, and display the results in the graphical user 
interface (GUI), as shown in Fig. 4. The GUI is designed and 
developed using Glade and Gtkmm in order to display the 
detection performance and results. 
VI.  SCADA-SPECIFIC CYBER-SECURITY TEST-BED AND 
EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS 
This section presents a SCADA-specific cybersecurity 
testbed that focuses on a security enclave within the substation. 
It can be used to investigate cybersecurity vulnerabilities and 
implement proposed hybrid intrusion detection approaches in 
a SCADA system. The testbed is based on a real grid-
connected photovoltaic (PV) SCADA system that has been 
deployed in a practical environment, as illustrated in Fig. 5, 
which uses protocols based on IEC 60870-5 series. 
 
 
 
Fig. 5.  SCADA cyber-security test-bed  
A.  Testbed Architecture 
The testbed architecture contains an HMI, database, 
malicious host (simulated attacker), IDS host, protocol 
gateway (PG), IED simulator (hereafter referred to as IED), 
switch, firewall, router etc., as shown in the dashed box of Fig. 
5. Three Microsoft Windows-based hosts (HMI, PG, IED) 
simulate real-time SCADA communication in a substation. 
The HMI host simulates the master station where commercial 
off-the-shelf (COTS) SCADA supervisory control software is 
installed. The PG host with different COTS communication 
protocol gateway software is used to connect IEDs with the 
HMI. The HMI and PG are connected by a switch. The IED 
communicates with the PG using the IEC 60870-5-103 
protocol. Due to confidentiality concerns, the names of the 
SCADA software and the simulated IED in the testbed are 
withheld. 
The Linux-based malicious host is used to simulate a 
malware infected computer inside the LAN, or a laptop 
connected to the LAN from the outside (e.g., a maintenance 
access), which can be controlled by an attacker. Many 
cyberattacks can be investigated in the testbed, such as DoS, 
ARP spoofing, and man-in-the-middle (MITM) attacks. 
For testing, the proposed SCADA-specific IDS is deployed 
between the HMI and PG as an interior detection tool. The 
SCADA-IDS is implemented based on the ITACA tool in the 
Linux-based host (see IDS in Fig. 5) which is connected to the 
LAN by port mirroring.  
B.  Man-in-the-Middle Attack  
ARP is primarily used for resolving network layer addresses 
(IP addresses) into data-link layer addresses (Ethernet MAC 
addresses) in LAN communication. The ARP spoofing attack 
is used to modify the cached < IP, MAC>  pairing in the local 
ARP cache table [15]. Such a Man-in-the-middle (MITM) 
attack allows an attacker to sniff or tamper information in a 
LAN by ARP spoofing [16], [17]. 
In the testbed environment presented in this paper, an ARP 
spoofing attack is launched by a Metasploit [18] module in 
Backtrack 5 which is Linux-based penetration testing 
software. This approach is used as it is straightforward to 
perform for testing purposes. Other more complex “MITM” 
attacks may be caused by malware, resulting in similar 
behaviors in the network. ARP is a stateless and trusting 
protocol and does not provide any verification mechanism to 
verify the authenticity of the ARP requests and replies, so 
attacks are possible from malicious hosts in an LAN. In the 
ARP cache poisoning attack launched by Metasploit, the 
attacker (MH) sends ARP replies to the PG host indicating 
that HMI host with the IP **.100.100.98 has the MAC 
**:**:27:ed:09:0f which is the MAC address of the attacker, 
so the PG host will update its ARP cache table with the 
< **.100.100.98, **:**:27:ed:09:0f>  paring. In this case, the 
attacker impersonates the HMI so that the PG host will send 
packets destined to the HMI to the attacker instead.  
Similarly, the HMI host can also become the target host of 
a spoofing attack. After local ARP cache in the HMI is 
poisoned, the < IP, MAC>  pairing in the ARP cache table will 
be updated from < **.100.100.80, **:**:43:bb:74:4a>  to 
< **.100.100.80, **:**:27:ed:09:0f> .  
Furthermore, by poisoning the HMI host and the PG host at 
the same time, the attacker can silently stay in the middle of 
the two hosts (HMI and PG) to launch a MITM attack in the 
test-bed in order to easily sniff all the traffic sent in both 
directions and inject new data into both. The malicious 
attacker may utilize the intercepted information to launch 
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 more severe attacks later.  
In the MITM attack experiment, an attack simulator is 
developed using C/C++ in order to send modified information 
to the HMI host or the PG host. The injected malicious data 
from the attacker will be displayed on the screen of the HMI 
host which may mislead the operator. In a worse-case context, 
a false remote operation command such as “open the circuit 
breaker” from the attacker could shed the PV grid and affect 
power-supply reliability and perhaps threaten safety. 
C.  SCADA-IDS Experiment and Results 
For the SCADA-IDS experiment, test network traffic was 
generated which included normal and malicious packets which 
may be the goal of an MITM attack. The normal SCADA 
traffic between the HMI and the PG was captured by the 
SCADA-IDS host which is connected to the LAN via port 
mirroring, as shown in Fig. 5. Then, abnormal packets were 
introduced into the test dataset by the MITM attack 
experiment in order to verify proposed whitelist and behavior-
based detection approaches. In this experiment, 500 packets 
are captured including 50 (10%) simulated abnormal packets, 
and wherein the number of abnormal packets violating ACW, 
PBW and BBR is 12 (2.4%), 7 (1.4%) and 31 (6.2%), 
respectively. It can be seen from the experimental results that 
the proposed SCADA-IDS can effectively identify all 
abnormal data without false positives for the given 
experiment, as shown in Fig. 6.  
 
 
 
Fig. 6.  The GUI for displaying SCADA-IDS detection results 
 
The SCADA-IDS records the detection results in a log file 
and displays in the GUI (Fig. 6). The log file is defined 
referring to RFC 3164. The message format is as follows:  
<SEVERITY> TIMESTAMP DEVICE_NAME DEVICE_TYPE 
ALERT_TYPE EVENT_DESCRIPTION SRC_IP SRC_PORT 
DST_IP DST_PORT 
In this case, SEVERITY represents alert severity which is 
described by a numerical code, e.g., 0, 1, 2 and 3 stand for 
EMERGENCY, ERROR, WARNNING and NOTICE, respectively. 
The TIMESTAMP field is the local time and is in the format of 
“YYYY-MM-DD HH:MM:SS”. DEVICE_NAME means the name 
or IP address of specific security device. DEVICE_TYPE is the 
type of the security device, e.g., IDS. ALERT_TYPE 
represents an alert event type which is violated, such as ACW, 
PBW, or BBR. EVENT_DESCRIPTION describes the detailed 
information of the specific security event. SRC_IP, 
SRC_PORT, DST_IP and DST_PORT are source IP address, 
source port, destination IP address and destination port, 
respectively. 
The log messages that have been generated as an output 
from this experiment are explained in detail as follows. Fig. 7 
shows an alert that a suspicious Ethernet destination MAC 
address is detected when the packet is sent from PG host 
(**.100.100.80) to HMI host (**.100.100.98). In the alert 
resulting from an ARP spoofing attack, one of ACWs is 
violated (discussed in Section IV-A). 
 
<0> 2012-07-08 20:07:25 SCADA-IDS IDS ACW-2 
Suspicious Ethernet destination MAC address 
(**:**:27:ed:09:0f) **.100.100.80 4512 **.100.100.98 
4512 
 
Fig. 7.  The ACW alert message in the log file 
 
In Fig. 8, the suspicious SCADA protocol is detected by 
PBW, which verifies the proposed protocol based whitelist 
approach mentioned in Section IV-B. Any cyberattacks which 
violates the SCADA protocol specification will be alerted. 
 
<0> 2012-07-08 20:07:25 SCADA-IDS IDS PBW Suspicious 
SCADA protocol **.100.100.80 4512 **.100.100.98 4512 
Fig. 8.  The PBW alert message in the log file 
 
Fig. 9 illustrates part of the alert messages generated due to 
the BBR violation (described in Section IV-C). For example, 
BBR-1, BBR-2, BBR-4, BBR-8, BBR-10-1 and BBR-11 
specifically refer to the correlation detector, relay function 
detector, time-related detector, length detector, range detector 
 and function code detector, respectively. The results show 
how this behavior based approach can be effective against 
zero-day attacks, since the physical effects are also detected, 
rather than only the IT causes. 
<0> 2012-07-08 20:07:25 SCADA-IDS IDS BBR-1 
Suspicious measured values or remote communication 
**.100.100.80 4512 **.100.100.98 4512 
<0> 2012-07-08 20:07:25 SCADA-IDS IDS BBR-2 
Suspicious measured values or relay protection 
signals **.100.100.80 4512 **.100.100.98 4512 
<0> 2012-07-08 20:07:25 SCADA-IDS IDS BBR-4 
Suspicious remote command **.100.100.98 4512 
**.100.100.80 4512 
<0> 2012-07-08 20:07:25 SCADA-IDS IDS BBR-8 
Suspicious butter overflow **.100.100.80 4512 
**.100.100.98 4512 
<0> 2012-07-08 20:07:25 SCADA-IDS IDS BBR-10-1 
Suspicious measured value **.100.100.80 4512 
**.100.100.98 4512 
<0> 2012-07-08 20:07:25 SCADA-IDS IDS BBR-11 
Suspicious function code **.100.100.80 4512 
**.100.100.98 4512 
Fig. 9.  The BBR alert messages in the log file 
D.  Maximum Execution Time Estimate 
To guarantee reliable operation in SCADA-based control 
systems in power systems, latency is a critical issue for 
communications. Thus, it is necessary to consider the latency 
introduced by any cybersecurity process. A statistical 
estimation model using Gumbel distribution in [22] is adopted 
to predict extreme execution time based on execution time 
samples obtained by experiments. The Gumbel distribution 
belongs to the extreme value distribution family, which has a 
cumulative distribution function representing the likelihood 
that the maximum of a set of sample data of the form {x1, …, 
xn} will be equal to, or less than, x. The Gumbel distribution 
function is as follows: 
     0, , exp exp ,xG x x                  (10) 
where  and  are location and scale parameters, which can be 
estimated by maximum-likelihood estimation (detailed 
information is in [22]). 
Equation (10) may give the estimated value less than the 
largest piece of sample data. It is necessary for the estimation 
of maximum execution time to only consider values greater 
than the largest value of sample data denoted by maxi. 
Considering this constraint, the Gumbel distribution is as 
follows: 
                , 0, , 1
imax
ii
i i
i i
x G x P X x X max
P max X x G x G max
P X max G max
           
   
(11) 
The estimation of the maximum execution time is derived 
from (11). For any estimate i the probability that the most 
extreme execution time will occur at, or below, this value will 
be based on the estimation model, as shown 
   ( )0, , 1ii imax i i iG                                (12) 
where i is the likelihood at which an estimate of the 
maximum execution time is exceeded, and i is corresponding 
confidence level. 
In this experiment, the SCADA-IDS execution 
environment uses an Ubuntu 11.04 64-bit operating system 
running on a quad-core Intel i7 processor using a g++ 4.5.2 
compiler. This experiment was repeated 60 times, with a 
maximum execution time max =  59 s, a sample mean of 46.5 s, and a standard variance of 24.8. The scale parameter  and 
the location parameter  is 19.34 and 35.34, respectively. 
Therefore, the estimation model of the maximum execution 
time for the SCADA-IDS experiment based on (11) and (12) 
is given as: 
      , ex2.92 3.92 p exp 0.0517 1.827x x         (13) 
From (13), it is possible to evaluate the confidence with 
different estimate values for maximum execution time, as 
shown in Fig. 10.  
From the aforementioned statistical analysis, it can be seen 
that the estimated maximum execution time of the SCADA-
IDS is less than or equal to 151 s with 99% confidence (Fig. 
10) and less than or equal to 254 s with 100% confidence, 
which would not compromise timely availability of data for 
normal operation of SCADA systems. According to IEEE 
standards for electric power substation automation [19], high-
speed protection information data delivery time requirements 
are less than ¼ cycle (5 ms in 50-Hz systems). Clearly, the 
latency of the SCADA-IDS meets the specified time 
requirement of electricity control systems. 
 
Fig. 10.  The diagram of confidence level against maximum execution time 
estimate 
VII.  DISCUSSION  
According to the aforementioned experiments and results, it 
is clear that the proposed multiattribute SCADA-IDS is an 
effective tool for early warning, detection and prevention of 
intrusion and abnormal behaviors in evolving SCADA which 
will support power systems automation.  
The statistical IDS [9] applied to SCADA systems adopts 
statistical approaches such as neural networks and Bayesian 
methods to distinguish the abnormal data from the normal 
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 traffic. However, these methods may lead to false positives 
and false negatives which inevitably will result in false alarms 
and missed attacks. Therefore, although such techniques have 
some merits, when used alone they are not sufficiently 
accurate. This is partly why a multiattribute approach is 
preferable.  
Setting aside the statistical approach, a comparison will 
now be considered between the proposed IDS and the most 
relevant state-of-the-art proposals. Although it is difficult to 
directly compare different SCADA-specific IDS technologies 
which use different scenarios and protocols, some indirect and 
valid comparisons can be made, as shown in Table I.  
First, the proposed SCADA-IDS provides wider 
compatibility in terms of application scenarios and protocols 
handled, for example, SCADA protocols in digital substations,  
such as IEC 60870-5 series, DNP3, and proprietary protocols. 
In comparison, [6] and [7] only support Modbus TCP in power 
plants and process control systems, respectively. The Snort 
rules in [8] refer to ARP, Internet control message protocol 
(ICMP), hypertext transfer protocol (HTTP), file transfer 
protocol (FTP), Telnet, rather than the SCADA protocols 
themselves. The proposed IDS also extends the attack scenario 
detection abilities in [8], namely, MITM against SCADA 
protocols. 
Compared with the proposed multiattribute IDS 
implementation on ITACA, [8] uses blacklist rules in Snort 
parlance, which are not effective against unknown attack. In 
addition, the proposed IDS implementation has better 
flexibility than Snort. 
  
TABLE I  
SCADA-Specific IDS Comparisons 
 
IDS Application scenarios Protocols Implementation 
methods 
Implementation 
tool Process time Accuracy 
[6] Power plants  Modbus TCP Critical state analysis C# < 1 ms 99% 
[7] Process control 
systems  Modbus TCP Model-based detection Snort Not published Not published 
[8] IEC 61850 substations ARP/ICMP/HTTP/ FTP/Telnet Blacklist rules Snort Not published 100% 
[23] Some SCADA 
systems Modbus/DNP3 State-based detection C# Not published    100% 
*
 
Proposed 
SCADA-
IDS 
Digital substations 
IEC 60870-5 series/ 
DNP3/proprietary 
protocol etc 
Whitelist and behaviour 
based approaches 
(ACW+PBW+BBR) 
ITACA 
(C/C++) < 254 s 100% 
 
     Note: * The accuracy is 100% under the data rates of 180 kb/s. 
 
This is because it is built using ITACA which provides 
database capabilities to implement user-defined detection 
strategies, such as correlation detector, relay function detector, 
and range detector. With Snort, it is difficult to realize these 
behavior-based rules.  
The process time is a critical property for evaluating 
SCADA-IDS performance; however, unfortunately, [7], [8], 
and [23] do not provide evident IDS execution times. 
According to the statistical estimation in Section VI-D, the 
maximum execution time will be less than or equal to 254 s 
with 100% confidence, which is better than [6]. In terms of the 
IDS accuracy, because deterministic detection approaches are 
presented, rather than statistical or pattern-recognition 
algorithms [8], the proposed IDS will consequently detect all 
malicious packets in any given experiment.  
Compared with the previous IDS methods, the novel 
approach proposed here firstly applies whitelist and behavior 
based IDS to SCADA systems combining knowledge of 
power systems (domain knowledge) with network security 
techniques. In particular, it is based on fully considering the 
operational features and most common protocols of SCADA 
systems. In addition, the proposed SCADA-IDS can 
effectively identify permitted and non-permitted devices, 
connections, and protocols with enhanced payload inspection 
functionality to detect permitted and non-permitted behaviors 
and operations. Therefore, the multiattribute SCADA-specific 
IDS can be effective against not only known attacks but also 
unknown attacks. Moreover, it can deal with intrusions from 
outside electric utilities as well as inadvertent events from 
inside, in order to make cyberspace in SCADA systems more 
secure. Furthermore, as it passively analyzes data on the 
network, the susceptibility of the IDS itself to attacks is 
minimal. The proposed SCADA-IDS was implemented as a 
plug-in in ITACA, and the flexible design architecture of 
ITACA ensures that the SCADA-IDS plug-in provides  
sufficient throughput and low latency such that the practical 
communication requirements [19] of SCADA systems in 
power systems are met, as shown in Section VI-D.  
In order to successfully deploy the proposed SCADA-IDS 
into a live real-world environment, careful consideration will 
need to be given to how the tool can be optimally configured 
during the initialization stage. Security engineers installing 
tools in this domain must understand specific aspects of the 
SCADA systems to which the IDS will be deployed. 
Knowledge of the communication protocols, field device 
functions, and application environments is also vital to ensure 
that false positive or false negative alarms are minimized. It is 
advisable that initial tests be carried out on “mirrored” systems 
that exactly replicate the performance of the live SCADA 
system, in order to provide a robust verification stage that is 
not possible in the presented testbed. Ongoing efforts will also 
be required in order to update the capabilities of the IDS to 
detect and mitigate emerging and evolving threats. 
Finally, a significant challenge in this area of research is 
 the lack of an openly available test dataset to compare the 
performance and accuracy of proposed solutions. This is 
understandable from the perspective of SCADA system 
operators, due to the sensitive nature of the data. However, for 
research in the community to progress, such a dataset would 
be valuable. 
VIII.  CONCLUSION  
This paper has presented a layered cybersecurity frame- 
work for SCADA systems which combines security enclaves, 
IDS technology, and behavioral monitoring to make SCADA 
systems more secure. The framework provides a hierarchical 
approach for an integrated security system, comprising 
distributed IDSs. This approach is compatible with currently 
emerging trends toward using SIEM technology to monitor 
smart grids and other critical infrastructure. In this context, a 
novel SCADA-IDS with whitelists and behavior-based 
SCADA protocol analysis is proposed and exemplified in 
order to detect known and unknown cyberattacks from inside 
or outside SCADA systems. Finally, the proposed SCADA-
IDS is implemented and successfully validated through a 
series of realistic scenarios performed in a SCADA-specific 
testbed developed to replicate cyberattacks against a 
substation LAN. 
Digital substations are critical nodes that are integral to the 
core functions of electricity grids. Consequently, their 
dependable operation is essential to ensure that power delivery 
remains secure, stable, and reliable. In the context of the rapid 
development and deployment of digital substations around the 
world, timely research on emerging cybersecurity issues in 
this area is a highly relevant and urgent issue. However, 
securing the digital substation environment is just part of a 
wider and significant effort that is required to ensure the 
secure operation of advanced power systems. Many challenges 
remain to be addressed in other subsystems and for the higher 
level communications architecture where subsystems are 
interconnected. 
Based on published knowledge of cybervulnerabilities and 
attack scenarios, it is clear that a large number of viable 
cybersecurity issues exist against smart-grid SCADA systems, 
which could threaten digital substations. To the best of the 
authors’ knowledge and with reference to the discussion in 
Section VII, it is believed that the proposed comprehensive 
approach and implemented SCADA-IDS present a significant 
contribution to address emerging cyberthreats to digital 
substations, and the se- cure operation of the wider smart-grid 
infrastructure. 
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